A module calls txm_module_object_allocate and chooses object_size. The manager
adds sizeof(TXM_MODULE_ALLOCATED_OBJECT) to it and asked the object pool for the
result without checking the addition, so a size near the top of a ULONG wrapped:
object_size 0xFFFFFFF8 asked for eight bytes, the pool served them, and the
manager then wrote its sixteen-byte header -- owner, list links and size -- into
that eight-byte block and linked it into the module's allocation list. Eight
bytes of the next block's contents or header are gone by the time the call
returns, and the shared object pool that every module allocates from is the thing
that was corrupted.
The addition is now made with the repository's own overflow-checked helper, which
was already used on both load paths and simply never reached this one, and it is
made before the protection mutex is taken so a refused request leaves the pool,
the allocation list and its count exactly as they were. Sizes that survive the
addition need no further bound here: _txe_byte_allocate refuses a request larger
than the pool, so the alignment round-up in _tx_byte_allocate is never reached
with a value that could wrap in its turn.
Regression coverage runs on the host by modelling the byte pool behind the
manager. The model applies the two bounds _txe_byte_allocate applies and hands
out a block of precisely the requested length with a guard band immediately
after it, so an undersized allocation is caught as the out-of-bounds write it is
rather than inferred from arithmetic. Thirty-two of its expectations fail against
the previous implementation, twenty reporting state a refused request must not
have touched and two reporting the eight and twelve bytes written past the end of
the block. It reaches 100% line, branch and call coverage of the changed
function; the lines it leaves uncovered are its own failure reporting, plus the
modelled pool's zero-size refusal, which only an unfixed build reaches.
Assisted-by: Claude Code (Opus 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Refused to give back the memory of a live kernel object
A module allocates the control blocks of its kernel objects from the Module
Manager's object pool and can ask for that memory back by address. The manager
released it whatever was in it, including a control block the kernel was still
using. Deallocation is not deletion: the object stays on the created list for its
type, a thread stays wherever it was on the ready or suspension lists and stays
schedulable, and an active timer stays on the timer list. Nothing on those paths
consults a control block ID, so nothing about the memory having been freed stops
the kernel from using it -- a created list walk reads a name pointer out of it and
follows that pointer, a create or delete of another object of the same type writes
through the created links in it, the scheduler switches the stack pointer to the
word at offset 8 of it and pops a saved processor state, and timer expiration
calls the function pointer in it. Meanwhile the byte pool is free to hand those
same bytes to the next allocation, so what the kernel goes on reading as a control
block becomes whatever the next owner of the memory puts there, through ordinary
create services.
The manager now refuses to release memory that holds an object which is still
created, and returns TX_DELETE_ERROR without touching the allocation, the object
or the memory. Deleting the object first is what makes its memory releasable,
which is the sequence the delete dispatchers already follow and the one module
authors are told to follow.
The question is answered from the kernel's created lists, not from the control
block. A control block ID is not evidence that an object is there: an allocation
that was never created can be carrying the value of an ID, and refusing on that
would strand memory a module is entitled to have back. Deallocation is also given
an address and nothing else, so unlike a typed service it cannot be told which
list to search, and each of the eight lists is searched in turn. The search is not
narrowed by the size of the allocation, because that would be sound only if every
object had been created through a size-checked path, and a module running without
memory protection creates objects through no such path -- a queue at the start of a
thread-sized allocation is a case the tests here cover. Each list is searched in
its own interrupts-disabled window, bounded by the count the kernel keeps beside
it, so the longest window is the length of one type's list and a list whose links
have been damaged cannot make the search run on. The whole search is one pass over
the objects the system has created, paid once per object deallocation.
Storage that is not an object is released exactly as before, which is what keeps
cleanup after a create that failed or was abandoned working, and what makes the
release each delete dispatcher performs after a successful delete go through.
The address the request arrives with is now checked before the manager's private
header in front of it is read, rather than partly after. The size of the
allocation comes from that header, so there is nothing to validate a size against
until the header has been read, and the previous order established only where the
header started: a header that began inside the pool and ended past it had its size
word read from outside the pool. That check has moved out of the dispatcher into
_txm_module_manager_param_check_object_for_deallocation, alongside the other
parameter checks the dispatch table uses and where a test can reach it, and it now
also refuses a size that would carry the end of the allocation past the top of the
address space instead of wrapping it, since a wrapped end compares as though the
allocation were inside the pool.
The 301 expectations in the new test drive all eight object types through allocate,
create, a refused deallocation, delete, and a deallocation that succeeds, and
assert after the refusal that nothing reached the pool, that the allocation is
still on the module's list at the head of it, that the control block still carries
its ID and that the object is still live. They cover storage that was never
created, storage carrying nothing but a plausible ID for each of the eight types,
an object at the start of an oversized allocation, every aligned interior offset
of a live object with that object's own ID planted at it, an application-owned
object outside the pool, another module's allocations both live and raw, releasing
the head of a list of several and releasing the same address twice, a type that has
no created list, the bounds on the search against a list longer than its count and
against a count larger than its list for every type, the boundary addresses at both
ends of the pool, a crafted size, and an object pool that was never created.
Removing the refusal fails 43 of them; removing the size wrap guard fails one.
Line and branch coverage of the three new functions and of the changed
_txm_module_manager_object_deallocate is 100%, with one exception that is test
scaffolding rather than product code: the host shim's stand-in for TX_RESTORE has
an underflow guard, and the test asserts that branch is never taken. All 99 tests
pass in each of the five configurations the tree builds with GCC 14.
Assisted-by: Claude Code (Opus 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Removed the object deallocation bounds check superseded by the search
_txm_module_manager_param_check_object_for_deallocation() bounded the private
header in front of a caller's address before the deallocator read it. The
deallocator no longer reads that header: it finds the allocation by searching
the module's own allocation list, which never dereferences the address, so the
bounds check now guards a read that does not happen.
The function, its prototype, its macro and its one call site in the
txm_module_object_deallocate dispatcher are removed, along with the twelve
expectations that covered it and three declarations left unused by their
removal. The search proves more than the check did: the bounds test established
only that the header lay inside the object pool, while the search establishes
that the address is the exact start of one of this module's allocations.
The live object deallocation test holds 289 expectations and passes. Reverting
the live-object guard still fails 51 of them, the same 51 as before the
deletion, so nothing the removed expectations covered was load-bearing. The
full suite passes 108/108 in default_build_coverage, with no warnings.
Assisted-by: Claude Code (Opus 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A module reaches a kernel object's delete service through the Module Manager's
dispatch layer, which asked one question about the pointer: does the object lie
outside the module's own code and data. That is the policy for using an object,
and using an object a module does not own is supported and intended --
txm_module_object_pointer_get_extended searches the system's created objects by
name and hands back objects the application created and objects other modules
created, so that a module can send to a shared queue, take a shared semaphore or
get a shared mutex. Destroying one of those is not sharing it. A module could
name any object it had a pointer to and have the privileged dispatcher delete it:
a host service lost its queue, waiters were resumed with TX_DELETED, an owned
mutex's priority inheritance was unwound, and an active timer stopped.
Nothing in the manager intended that. The deallocation the delete path performs
afterwards has always required the memory to belong to the calling module, so a
delete of anything else could only ever end in TX_PTR_ERROR -- the ownership
requirement was already there and was enforced one step too late, after the
kernel object had been irreversibly destroyed and its waiters woken. An error
returned at that point describes a cleanup failure and restores nothing.
The eight delete dispatchers now ask the question before the delete rather than
after it. A memory-protected module may delete an object only if the object is
one it allocated from the manager's object pool, at the exact address the manager
returned to it, for an allocation made for that type's control block size -- the
same conditions the create dispatchers already apply, since deletion is the
inverse of creation. Anything else returns TXM_MODULE_INVALID_MEMORY, which is
what every other parameter rejection in the dispatch table returns, so no new
value enters the module ABI and a module cannot use a delete request to tell
"not yours" apart from "not a usable address". The object stays created, nothing
waiting on it is resumed, and no created count moves, because the kernel was
never asked.
The ownership question is deliberately separate from whether an object is there
at all and of the expected type. It establishes nothing about liveness or type,
and it is composed with the checks that do rather than replacing them.
_txm_module_manager_object_deallocate reached the manager's private header by
subtracting from whatever address the caller supplied, and read it before
deciding whether it was a header. All eight delete dispatchers call that function
directly, so an object the module does not own arrived there as a matter of
course rather than exceptionally: for an object the application allocated
statically, or for any address outside the object pool, the words in front of it
were unrelated memory read in privileged mode -- and acted on, since an address
whose preceding words happened to name the calling module was unlinked from that
module's allocation list and handed to the byte pool.
It now finds the allocation by searching the module's own allocation list. The
caller's address is compared and never dereferenced, so an address that names
none of this module's allocations is refused without a privileged read of
anything in front of it, and the search establishes what the header read could
not: that the address is the exact start of an allocation rather than somewhere
inside one. The search is bounded by the count the manager keeps beside the list
and runs with interrupts disabled, so a damaged list cannot make it run on and it
cannot observe the list being changed under it. The fix is in the deallocation
itself rather than at a call site, so it covers all eight delete dispatchers, the
deallocation request a module can make directly, protected and unprotected
modules alike.
txm_module_manager_stop needs no exemption and was not given one. It deletes the
objects a module created by calling the internal _tx_*_delete services directly,
and identifies them with _txm_module_manager_created_object_check rather than
through a module request, so no caller-facing check stands in its way.
The 209 expectations in the new test drive all eight object types through
allocation, an ownership check by the owning module and by another, a check
against a larger and a smaller expected size, and a deallocation that succeeds.
They cover an object the application owns, deliberately preceded by a header
naming the requesting module so that reading it can be seen to have happened;
another module's object, checked and refused from both sides; every aligned
interior offset of an allocation and the addresses of its header, its end, the
pool's ends and one past the pool; a null pointer and an address with no room for
a header in front of it; a request from no module at all; memory that has changed
hands, where a stale pointer names an address that now belongs to another module;
the bounds on the search, against a count smaller than the list and against a
count larger than a list whose links are broken; releasing the head, the middle
and the last of a list of three; and an object pool that was never created. Every
call asserts that the interrupt lock came back balanced, and that the search ran
with interrupts disabled exactly one deep.
Restoring the previous deallocation fails four of them and then segmentation
faults, on the null-pointer case, where the header in front of address zero is
read; removing the ownership check fails 74.
Line and branch coverage of the two new functions and of the changed
_txm_module_manager_object_deallocate is 100%, with two branch outcomes excepted
that are test scaffolding rather than product code: the host shim's stand-ins for
TX_DISABLE and TX_RESTORE carry a maximum-depth test and an underflow guard, and
the real ports' primitives are inline assembly with no branch at all. All 99
tests pass in each of the five configurations the tree builds with GCC 14.
Nothing in the tree compiles the dispatch header, so the eight changed
dispatchers were cross-compiled by hand: the two changed C files and a
translation unit that includes the header build at -Werror with arm-none-eabi-gcc
13.2.1 for every GNU 32-bit module port -- Cortex-A7, M0+, M23, M3, M33, M4 and
M7 -- and produce the same -Wall -Wextra warning counts as before the change, 117
on Cortex-A7 and 116 on each of the others. Cortex-R4 and RXv2 have no GNU module
port, and the two AArch64 module ports have no toolchain available here; the new
arithmetic is a comparison of two addresses of the same type, so a wider
ALIGN_TYPE changes nothing about it.
MISRA: all if bodies are braced, the address comparison goes through ALIGN_TYPE,
no pointer the caller supplied is dereferenced, and no goto appears. No deviation
is required.
Assisted-by: Claude Code (Opus 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A memory-protected module names the kernel objects it wants operated on by
address, and the Module Manager decided whether a privileged service could
dereference that address by asking only whether it fell outside the module. The
object pool is outside every module, so that test was satisfied by an address
shifted into the interior of one of the module's own privileged allocations,
which denotes no object at all. The bytes such an address presents as a control
block are bytes the module put there through ordinary create and set services,
so the control block ID at the front of them could be made to read as any type
the module chose, and the _txe_ layer's ID test then agreed. A module could
therefore have the kernel read and write fields of an object that does not
exist, at an address it picked; the reported chain reaches a privileged memset
across an attacker-chosen range that way.
Authentication now answers the question the location test could not: is this the
exact address of a live kernel object of the type this service expects. It is
answered from the kernel's created list for the type, which the create and delete
services maintain, so membership establishes at once that the address is an
object start rather than an address inside an object, that the object is of this
type, and that it has not been deleted. That list is also what makes an object
the application created and shared with a module authenticable at all, since the
manager allocated no such object and has no record of its own to consult, so
sharing keeps working and needs no new registration API.
Nothing a module can influence is used to establish a type. An earlier form of
this fix accepted an address that was the exact start of one of the calling
module's own allocations of the right size and then took the type from the
control block ID, which is cheaper -- a module's allocation list is much shorter
than the system's created list for a type. The tests here refused it: a byte
pool, a mutex and a timer are all the same size on a 32-bit target, so an
allocation created as one of them and presented as another passed both the
address and the size test, leaving the ID as the only thing between the module
and a type confusion. The ID is still checked, after the created list has settled
the question, because it is the test the _txe_ services make and it is compiled
away with them under TX_DISABLE_ERROR_CHECKING. An address a module named is not
read at all until a kernel record says there is an object there.
All 58 object-using dispatchers now pass the object type rather than a control
block size, since a size cannot establish a type. Both scans are bounded by the
counts the kernel and the manager maintain beside their lists, so the cost of one
check is bounded and a list whose links have been damaged cannot make a scan run
on, and both run with interrupts disabled, which is the protection those lists
are maintained under and which adds no blocking point or priority inversion to a
kernel request. The cost is a walk of the created list for the type, paid only by
memory-protected modules; the size-based check is kept for dispatchers outside
this repository and hardened to refuse object pool interiors, which is the part
of the attack it can see without a type.
Two further changes close paths the authentication alone would leave open. Thread
reset now refuses a thread that carries no module instance: such a thread is
authentic, can be found by name and satisfies reset's own state test, and reset
reads the shell entry function out of that instance, so a null one was followed
in privileged mode. Object deallocation now clears the control block ID as it
gives memory back, so an object freed without being deleted first stops being
vouched for at the moment the manager stops owning its memory, rather than
returning to the pool still carrying a valid ID for the next allocation placed
there to present.
The 120 expectations in the new test offer every aligned interior offset of a
legitimate object as a foreign type, with that type's own ID planted at the
offset, and assert that none is accepted; they cover all eight object types
against each other, uncreated allocations, deleted objects, freed addresses that
have been handed out again, objects the application owns and memory that merely
carries a plausible ID, objects another module allocated, and the bounds on both
scans. Reverting the object checks to the permissive policy fails 89 of them;
removing the thread reset guard makes the test die with SIGSEGV inside the reset
path; removing the ID clearing in deallocation fails 2. All 99 tests pass in each
of the five configurations the tree builds with GCC 14.
Assisted-by: Claude Code (Opus 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
cortex_m / Cortex M0 build (push) Canceled after 0s
cortex_m / Cortex M3 build (push) Canceled after 0s
cortex_m / Cortex M4 build (push) Canceled after 0s
cortex_m / Cortex M7 build (push) Canceled after 0s
gcc_check / gnu (push) Canceled after 0s
r52_fvp / r52 (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_test / tx (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_test / smp (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_test / freertos (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_test / riscv (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_test / deploy (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_template / run_tests (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_template / deploy_code_coverage (push) Canceled after 0s
* Fixed the simulator ports so they compile when TX_MISRA_ENABLE is defined
_tx_thread_stack_build() in the four simulator ports converts the fake stack
pointer through TX_POINTER_TO_ALIGN_TYPE_CONVERT and
TX_ALIGN_TYPE_TO_POINTER_CONVERT. tx_api.h defines both macros only in the
non-MISRA branch of its #ifdef TX_MISRA_ENABLE, so with that macro defined the two
names are undeclared and none of the four files compiles.
Reproduced with:
gcc -m32 -c -DTX_MISRA_ENABLE -I common/inc -I ports/linux/gnu/inc \
ports/linux/gnu/src/tx_thread_stack_build.c -o /dev/null
which reports both names as implicit declarations and then an int to pointer
assignment. The same command without the define compiles cleanly.
No build configuration under test/tx/cmake or test/smp/cmake defines
TX_MISRA_ENABLE, so CI never compiles these files in that mode. It surfaced on a
branch that carries such a configuration.
The conversions are now written inline, which is what the non-MISRA macros expand
to and what the surrounding port code already does, including the line this
replaced.
The alternative would be the idiom common/src/tx_thread_create.c uses for the same
conversion: an explicit #ifdef selecting the ULONG pair under MISRA. That is not
equivalent here. On __x86_64__ this port defines ULONG as unsigned int and
ALIGN_TYPE as unsigned long long, so a pointer round-tripped through the ULONG pair
loses its top 32 bits. Writing the conversion inline keeps one form that is correct
in both modes and on both widths.
Verified by compiling the Linux port with and without TX_MISRA_ENABLE, both clean.
Assisted-by: Claude Code (Opus 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fixed the same MISRA build break in the SMP and module manager thread create
_tx_thread_create() in common_smp and _txm_module_manager_thread_create() convert the
thread's stack start through TX_POINTER_TO_ALIGN_TYPE_CONVERT and
TX_ALIGN_TYPE_TO_POINTER_CONVERT with no conditional at all. tx_api.h defines both
macros only in the non-MISRA branch, so with TX_MISRA_ENABLE and
TX_ENABLE_STACK_CHECKING both defined neither file compiles. It is the same defect as
the simulator ports in the previous commit, in two more files.
Reproduced with:
gcc -c -DTX_MISRA_ENABLE -DTX_ENABLE_STACK_CHECKING \
-I common_smp/inc -I ports_smp/linux/gnu/inc \
common_smp/src/tx_thread_create.c -o /dev/null
which reports both names as implicit declarations. Both files now compile with and
without TX_MISRA_ENABLE.
The conversions are written inline for the same reason as the ports: the #ifdef idiom
that common/src/tx_thread_create.c uses selects the ULONG pair under MISRA, which
truncates a pointer wherever ALIGN_TYPE is wider than ULONG. That is reported
separately.
Verified: the SMP regression suite passes 117 of 117, and the ThreadX suite still
builds.
Assisted-by: Claude Code (Opus 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
cortex_m / Cortex M0 build (push) Canceled after 0s
cortex_m / Cortex M3 build (push) Canceled after 0s
cortex_m / Cortex M4 build (push) Canceled after 0s
cortex_m / Cortex M7 build (push) Canceled after 0s
gcc_check / gnu (push) Canceled after 0s
r52_fvp / r52 (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_test / tx (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_test / smp (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_test / freertos (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_test / riscv (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_test / deploy (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_template / run_tests (push) Canceled after 0s
regression_template / deploy_code_coverage (push) Canceled after 0s
The per-edit disclosure named the product and model, so every agent and every
model version appended another line. 74 files carried two to four of them, and
the same five products had accumulated 13 spellings -- Copilot against GitHub
Copilot, Claude Sonnet 4.6 against claude-sonnet-4.6, four spellings of Codex.
Twenty assembly lines carried a doubled comment marker, `; //` or `@ //`.
Every file now carries exactly one line, fixed text naming no product:
Portions of this file were generated with AI assistance.
It is written with the comment character that file already uses, so the `;`
and `@` assembly files keep theirs and the doubled markers are gone. Precise
attribution stays on the commit, where the Assisted-by trailer is per-change,
dated and attached to the diff it describes. A header line cannot hold that
record honestly, because the code it names gets rewritten and the line stays.
A file-level flag answers whether; the history answers who.
Comment-only. 455 files, 455 insertions and 574 deletions: every removed line
was a disclosure line, every added line is the fixed text, and no file is left
with zero or with more than one. `scripts/check_ports.sh` passes, including the
reproducibility check that would catch a ports_arch master and its generated
copies drifting apart. Recompiled against dev, every file that builds without a
vendor toolchain gives a byte-identical object: 19 of 19 C files under common,
100 of 100 GNU assembly files, and all 16 assemblable files whose comment
marker changed. The 10 remaining marker changes are ac5 and IAR sources where
`;` already started the comment and only the redundant `//` was removed.
Assisted-by: Claude Code (Opus 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes#723
With `TX_ENABLE_STACK_CHECKING` and `TX_ENABLE_RANDOM_NUMBER_STACK_FILLING` both
enabled, `_tx_thread_create` picked a random byte, stored it in
`tx_thread_stack_fill_value`, filled the stack with it -- and then cleared the
whole control block with `TX_MEMSET`. The stack held the pattern while the
control block claimed zero, so `TX_THREAD_STACK_CHECK` and
`_tx_thread_stack_analyze` compared against the wrong value for the entire life
of the thread.
The value is now computed into a local and written back after the clear. The
clear stays where it is, because the module manager's error checking walks the
created list before the control block may be touched.
Fixed in `common/src/tx_thread_create.c`, `common_smp/src/tx_thread_create.c`
and `txm_module_manager_thread_create.c`, where it additionally left a user-mode
module thread's kernel stack filled with zeros.
`threadx_thread_stack_fill_value_test` creates sixteen unstarted threads and
checks each control block against the pattern in its stack, tolerating a random
zero byte without letting that hide the defect. Added to both suites: `ERROR #3`
on `dev` in `stack_checking_rand_fill_build`, green with the fix. Five tx
configurations at 104 tests, five SMP at 117, and all three sources clean under
`-Wall -Wextra` across every combination of the four stack-filling switches.
Assisted-by: Copilot (Opus 5) <noreply@github.com>
The module manager recorded tx_thread_module_kernel_stack_size as the raw
TXM_MODULE_KERNEL_STACK_SIZE constant, but the end of the kernel stack is aligned
downwards to an eight-byte boundary while _txm_module_manager_object_allocate only
guarantees ULONG alignment. The recorded size could therefore overstate the usable
stack by up to seven bytes. The scheduler copies this value into tx_thread_stack_size
whenever a user mode module thread enters the kernel, so the overstated value is
visible to RTOS-aware debuggers and to anything built on it.
The size is now derived from the aligned end minus the start. Also documented that
TX_ENABLE_STACK_CHECKING is not supported for module threads.
Refs #181
Assisted-by: Copilot (Opus 5) <noreply@github.com>
An absolutely located module has its code and its data placed at two
independent fixed addresses by the module's linker script. The module
preamble carries the code and data sizes but not the data address, so
_txm_module_manager_absolute_load() could not determine where the
module's data area was. It computed txm_module_instance_data_start
from the code size and the preamble size, which yields a size rather
than an address, and it set txm_module_instance_module_data_base_address
one past the end of the byte pool allocation.
Added _txm_module_manager_absolute_load_extended(), which accepts the
module's data area address from the caller. Deprecated
_txm_module_manager_absolute_load(), which now forwards to the extended
service with an unknown data area location and rejects modules that
request memory protection, since the memory protection hardware cannot
be programmed to cover an unknown data area.
Fixes#450
Assisted-by: Copilot (Opus 5) <noreply@github.com>
Added #pragma message compile-time warning to the module library
source and updated the DESCRIPTION blocks in both the library and
manager implementations.
Reason: this wrapper passes UINT_MAX as the name-buffer length to
the underlying extended search. The comparison loop can therefore
read past the end of a short name buffer, which is undefined
behaviour. Callers should use txm_module_object_pointer_get_extended()
and supply the actual buffer length.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Added a compile-time #pragma message warning to the module library
source so that any module that includes or compiles this file receives
an explicit deprecation notice at build time.
Updated the internal documentation block in the manager-side
implementation to explain that this function must not be called directly
and that calling it on a live object causes a use-after-free.
The Module Manager dispatch layer already releases pool memory
automatically after a successful tx_*_delete() call. Module authors
should remove any explicit call to txm_module_object_deallocate().
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
cee19603d Include tx_user.h conditionally.
e40e08007 Update owners
d69641273 Update release date and version
394aee52f Add tx_user.h to GNU port assembly files
5cca2ddd0 RISC-V 64 bit port for Microchip
e0f2c373c Link Winmm.lib that required by the high-resolution timer.
6af472a68 Update Win32 port with high resolution timer.
aea7b556a Add DMB ISH barrier inst in ARMv8-A SMP scheduler
19091a262 Add .section .preamble to m3 m4 m7 module ports
ced60e1b7 Add missing parenthesis in ports assembly file
309dc77ca Modules Cortex-A7 IAR new port
c752a4063 Modules Cortex-A7 GNU new port
dc224b90f Fix race condition in tx_thread_wait_abort and update regression test
6e261f5b7 create threadx cmsis-pack
9c3acb6ce armv8-m compile time FPU fix
37daa35e7 added tx_trace.h include to module stop.c
39824289f Remove internal deprecated files.
fe2f80f43 Add a notice for not released file.
7fdd3782a Upgrade to the latest Container Images.
b5d5df511 #include tx_user.h in assembly files for cortex-m ports
33e04e3d5 initial port of MIPS SMP for GHS and GNU
2eda2c17d capitalize extensions for M23 asm files
21c354ccb Fix armv7-m MPU settings for corner case, unify txm_module_port.h files
4a1ff93f9 remove uneeded include for ac6
c823e91ff update riscv iar example for latest iar tools
5559d185d check module stack for overlap (not kernel stack)
efa9ce7b7 apply patch from mobileye to fix time slice processing
75fdcb722 Updated copy_armv7_cm.yml
de04b9904 initialize unused MPU settings so that aliasing will work
79b317b60 add config directory to IAR RISC-V port in order to use simulator
Frédéric Desbiens
Bo Chen (from Dev Box)
TiejunZhou
yajunxiaMS
Xiuwen CaiandTiejunZhou
Tiejun Zhou
Scott Larson
Yuxin Zhou