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* Each Apache project should have its own security guide. * Security section is added to the NuttX documentation. * Information about reported and fixed CVEs. * Information and hints on how to report and handle security issues in accordance with The Apache Security Team [1] and Committers Guide [2]. * Information on what is and is not considered a vulnerability. * List of existing NuttX CVEs added. [1] https://www.apache.org/security [2] https://www.apache.org/security/committers.html Signed-off-by: Tomasz 'CeDeROM' CEDRO <tomek@cedro.info>
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========
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Security
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========
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.. toctree::
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Known vulnerabilities
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=====================
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Apache NuttX RTOS vulnerabilities are labelled with CVE (Common
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Vulnerabilities and Exposures) identifiers. List of known, responsibly
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disclosed, and fixed vulnerabilities are publicly available online at
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`CVE.ORG <https://www.cve.org/CVERecord/SearchResults?query=nuttx>`_
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and at the bottom of this page in the `NuttX CVEs`_ section.
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`CVE <https://cve.org/>`_ IDs are unique identifiers given to security
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vulnerabilities. The Apache Security Team is a
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`CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) <https://www.cve.org/ProgramOrganization/CNAs>`_
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covering all Apache projects and is the only group able to allocate IDs
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to Apache Software Foundation project issues.
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Not security vulnerabilities
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============================
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Apache NuttX RTOS is highly portable to over 15 different CPU architectures,
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including microcontrollers with as tiny memory resources as single kilobytes
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of RAM/Flash memory. Putting additional checks outside a generic nature would
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dramatically impact final firmware performance and size.
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**Function parameters and incoming data validation rests on the custom
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application/firmware developer.**
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Special care should be taken when handling:
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* syscalls.
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* pointers (always set to NULL before and after use).
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* structures (always initialize with ``{0}`` before use).
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* user controllable data (type and size).
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* network data.
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* dynamically allocated buffers.
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.. note::
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If you find a generic problem in existing code base that
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may impact Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability (i.e. information
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leak, denial of service, remote code execution) and is not your own custom
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application specific, please send us a security report.
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Security Issues Handling
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========================
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Security related issues are handled in compliance with
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`The Apache Security Team Guide <https://www.apache.org/security/>`_
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and `Apache Committers Security Guide
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<https://www.apache.org/security/committers.html>`_.
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Please read these documents carefully before submitting and/or
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handling a security vulnerabilities. Below is an extract of the information.
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.. warning::
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Do not enter details of security vulnerabilities in a project's public
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bug tracker, issues, or pull requests. Do not make information about
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the vulnerability public until it is formally announced at the end
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of this process. Messages associated with any commits should not make
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any reference to the security nature of the commit.
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1. Report:
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1. Please report potential security vulnerabilities over email to
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security@nuttx.apache.org **before disclosing them in any public form**.
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This enables responsible disclosure by providing a fix for everyone
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impacted before details are made public. Messages sent to our security@
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address are automatically copied to security@apache.org.
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2. Please send one plain-text, unencrypted, email for each vulnerability
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you are reporting. We may ask you to resubmit your report if you send
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it as an image, movie, HTML, or PDF attachment when you could as easily
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describe it with plain text.
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3. Do not enter details of security vulnerabilities in a project's public
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bug tracker, issues, or pull requests. **Do not make information about
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the vulnerability public until it is formally announced at the end
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of this process.** Messages associated with any commits should not make
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any reference to the security nature of the commit.
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4. Security fixes are usually part of the standard release cycle, but for
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urgent cases special patch releases may be created to address the issue.
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In order to keep this process smooth please provide us with as much
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details as possible. **Reproducible examples, proof-of-concept code,
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but most importantly fix patches are more than welcome.**
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5. There are problems that we are well aware of, and have been reported
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to us many times, but we do not classify as a security vulnerability, see
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`Not security vulnerabilities`_ for details.
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Please consider reporting them as Issue or Pull Request on GitHub instead.
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6. The project team sends an e-mail to the original reporter to acknowledge
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the report, with a copy to the relevant security mailing list.
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2. Investigation:
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1. The project team investigates the report and either rejects or accepts it.
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2. Project team members may share information about the vulnerability
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with domain experts (including colleagues at their employer) at the
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discretion of the project's security team, providing that they make
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clear that the **information is not for public disclosure.**
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3. If the project team **rejects** the report, the team writes to the
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reporter to explain why, with a copy to the relevant security mailing
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list.
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4. If the project team **accepts** the report, the team writes to the
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reporter to let them know that they have accepted the report and that
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they are working on a fix or validating fix provided by the reporter.
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CVE ID is requested where problem details are reported upon resolution.
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3. Resolution:
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1. The project team agrees on a fix on their private list.
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2. The project team requests a CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures)
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ID from the internal portal, https://cveprocess.apache.org.
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Apache Security Team can help determine if a report requires multiple
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CVE IDs or if multiple reports should be merged under a single CVE ID.
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CVE ID can be shared with the reporter.
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3. The project team documents the details of the vulnerability and the fix
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on the internal portal. The portal generates draft announcement texts.
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For an example of an announcement see Tomcat's announcement of
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CVE-2008-2370. The level of detail to include in the report is a matter
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of judgement. Generally, reports should contain enough information to
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enable people to assess the risk the vulnerability poses for their own
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system, and no more. **Announcements do not normally include steps
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to reproduce the vulnerability.**
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4. Optionally CVE can be set into the REVIEW state to request a review from
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the Apache Security team. Discussion is possible using the "comment"
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feature which also sends the comments to the private mailing list(s).
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5. The project team provides the reporter with a copy of the fix and the
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draft vulnerability announcement for comment.
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6. The project team agrees on the fix, the announcement, and the release
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schedule with the reporter. If the reporter is unresponsive in a
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reasonable timeframe this should not block the project team from moving
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to the next steps, particularly if an issue is of high severity/impact.
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7. The project team commits the fix **without making any reference that
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the commit relates to a security vulnerability.**
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8. The project team creates a release that includes the fix.
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4. Public announcement:
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1. After (or at the same time as) the release announcement, the project
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team announces the vulnerability and the fix. CVE status is set to READY
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in the internal portal, that is also used to send emails.
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**This is the first point that any information regarding the
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vulnerability is made public.** The vulnerability announcement should
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be sent to the following destinations:
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a. the same destinations as the release announcement.
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b. the vulnerability reporter.
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c. the project's security list (or security@apache.org if
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the project does not have a dedicated security list).
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d. oss-security@lists.openwall.com (subscription not required).
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2. The project team updates the project's security pages.
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NuttX CVEs
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==========
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CVE-2025-48769
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--------------
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* Title: fs/vfs/fs_rename: use after free.
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* Published: 2026-01-01.
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* Affected versions: >= 7.20 , < 12.11.0.
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* Fixed in versions: 12.11.0.
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* Type: `CWE-416 Use After Free <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.html>`_.
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* Credits:
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* Finder: Liu, Richard Jiayang <rjliu3@illinois.edu>.
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* Remediation developer: Liu, Richard Jiayang <rjliu3@illinois.edu>.
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* Coordinator: Arnout Engelen <engelen@apache.org>.
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* Coordinator: Tomek CEDRO <cederom@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Xiang Xiao <xiaoxiang@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Jiuzhu Dong <jiuzhudong@apache.org>.
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* References:
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* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-48769.
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* http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/12/31/11.
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* https://github.com/apache/nuttx/pull/16455.
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* https://lists.apache.org/thread/7m83v11ldfq7bvw72n9t5sccocczocjn.
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Use After Free vulnerability was discovered in fs/vfs/fs_rename code of the
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Apache NuttX RTOS, that due recursive implementation and single buffer use by
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two different pointer variables allowed arbitrary user provided size buffer
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reallocation and write to the previously freed heap chunk, that in specific
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cases could cause unintended virtual filesystem rename/move operation results.
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This issue affects Apache NuttX RTOS: from 7.20 before 12.11.0. Users of
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virtual filesystem based services with write access especially when exposed
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over the network (i.e. FTP) are affected and recommended to upgrade to
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version 12.11.0 that fixes the issue.
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CVE-2025-48768
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--------------
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* Title: fs/inode: fs_inoderemove root inode removal.
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* Published: 2026-01-01.
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* Affected versions: >= 10.0.0 , < 12.10.0.
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* Fixed in version: 12.10.0.
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* Type: `CWE-763 Release of Invalid Pointer or Reference <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/763.html>`_.
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* Credits:
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* Finder: Liu, Richard Jiayang <rjliu3@illinois.edu>.
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* Remediation developer: Liu, Richard Jiayang <rjliu3@illinois.edu>.
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* Coordinator: Arnout Engelen <engelen@apache.org>.
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* Coordinator: Tomek CEDRO <cederom@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Alan Carvalho de Assis <acassis@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Tomek CEDRO <cederom@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Xiang Xiao <xiaoxiang@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Jiuzhu Dong <jiuzhudong@apache.org>.
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* References:
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* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-48768.
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* http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/12/31/10.
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* https://github.com/apache/nuttx/pull/16437.
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* https://lists.apache.org/thread/nwo1kd08b7t3dyz082q2pghdxwvxwyvo.
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Release of Invalid Pointer or Reference vulnerability was discovered in
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fs/inode/fs_inoderemove code of the Apache NuttX RTOS that allowed root
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filesystem inode removal leading to a debug assert trigger (that is disabled
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by default), NULL pointer dereference (handled differently depending on the
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target architecture), or in general, a Denial of Service. This issue affects
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Apache NuttX RTOS: from 10.0.0 before 12.10.0. Users of filesystem based
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services with write access that were exposed over the network (i.e. FTP)
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are affected and recommended to upgrade to version 12.10.0 that fixes
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the issue.
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CVE-2025-47869
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--------------
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* Title: examples/xmlrpc: Fix calls buffers size.
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* Published: 2025-06-16.
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* Affected versions: >= 6.22 , < 12.9.0.
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* Fixed in version: 12.9.0.
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* Type: `CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html>`_.
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* Credits:
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* Reporter: Chánh Phạm <chanhphamviet@gmail.com>.
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* Remediation developer: Arnout Engelen <engelen@apache.org>.
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* Coordinator: Arnout Engelen <engelen@apache.org>.
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* Coordinator: Tomek CEDRO <cederom@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Alan Carvalho de Assis <acassis@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Alin Jerpelea <jerpelea@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Lee, Lup Yuen <lupyuen@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Xiang Xiao <xiaoxiang@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Jianyu Wang <wangjianyu3@xiaomi.com>.
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* References:
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* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-47869.
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* http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/06/14/2.
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* https://github.com/apache/nuttx-apps/pull/3027.
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* https://lists.apache.org/thread/306qcqyc3bpb2ozh015yxjo9kqs4jbvj.
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Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
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vulnerability was discovered in Apache NuttX RTOS apps/exapmles/xmlrpc
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application. In this example application device stats structure that stored
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remotely provided parameters had hardcoded buffer size which could lead to
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buffer overflow. Structure members buffers were updated to valid size of
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CONFIG_XMLRPC_STRINGSIZE+1. This issue affects Apache NuttX RTOS users that
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may have used or base their code on example application as presented in
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releases from 6.22 before 12.9.0. Users of XMLRPC in Apache NuttX RTOS are
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advised to review their code for this pattern and update buffer sizes
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as presented in the version of the example in release 12.9.0.
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CVE-2025-47868
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--------------
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* Title: tools/bdf-converter.: tools/bdf-converter: Fix loop termination
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condition.
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* Published: 2025-06-16.
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* Affected versions: >= 6.9 , < 12.9.0.
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* Fixed in version: 12.9.0.
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* Type:
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* `CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/787.html>`_.
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* `CWE-122 Heap-based Buffer Overflow <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/122.html>`_.
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* Credits:
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* Finder: Chánh Phạm <chanhphamviet@gmail.com>.
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* Remediation developer: Nathan Hartman <hartmannathan@apache.org>.
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* Coordinator: Arnout Engelen <engelen@apache.org>.
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* Coordinator: Tomek CEDRO <cederom@apache.org>
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* Remediation reviewer: Alan Carvalho de Assis <acassis@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Alin Jerpelea <jerpelea@apache.com>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Lee, Lup Yuen <lupyuen@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Nathan Hartman <hartmannathan@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Simone Falsetti <simbit18@apache.org>.
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* References:
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* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-47868.
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* http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/06/14/1.
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* https://github.com/apache/nuttx/pull/16000.
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* https://lists.apache.org/thread/p4o2lcqgspx3ws1n2p4wmoqbqow1w1pw.
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Out-of-bounds Write resulting in possible Heap-based Buffer Overflow
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vulnerability was discovered in tools/bdf-converter font conversion utility
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that is part of Apache NuttX RTOS repository. This standalone program is
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optional and neither part of NuttX RTOS nor Applications runtime, but active
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bdf-converter users may be affected when this tool is exposed to external
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provided user data data (i.e. publicly available automation). This issue
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affects Apache NuttX: from 6.9 before 12.9.0. Users are recommended
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to upgrade to version 12.9.0, which fixes the issue.
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CVE-2025-35003
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--------------
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* Title: NuttX Bluetooth Stack HCI and UART DoS/RCE Vulnerabilities.
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* Published: 2025-05-26.
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* Affected versions: >= 7.25 , < 12.9.0.
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* Fixed in version: 12.9.0.
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* Type:
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* `CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html>`_.
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* `CWE-121 Stack-based Buffer Overflow <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/121.html>`_.
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* Credits:
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* Reporter: Chongqing Lei <leicq@seu.edu.cn>.
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* Reporter: Zhen Ling <zhenling@seu.edu.cn>.
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* Remediation developer: Chongqing Lei <leicq@seu.edu.cn>.
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* Coordinator: Arnout Engelen <engelen@apache.org>.
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* Coordinator: Tomek CEDRO <cederom@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Lee, Lup Yuen <lupyuen@apache.org>.
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* Remediation reviewer: Xiang Xiao <xiaoxiang@apache.org>.
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* References:
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* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-35003.
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* http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/05/26/1.
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* https://github.com/apache/nuttx/pull/16179.
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* https://lists.apache.org/thread/k4xzz3jhkx48zxw9vwmqrmm4hmg78vsj.
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Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer and
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Stack-based Buffer Overflow vulnerabilities were discovered in Apache NuttX
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RTOS Bluetooth Stack (HCI and UART components) that may result in system
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crash, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution, after receiving
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maliciously crafted packets. NuttX's Bluetooth HCI/UART stack users are
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advised to upgrade to version 12.9.0, which fixes the identified
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implementation issues.
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CVE-2021-34125
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--------------
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* Published: 2023-03-09.
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* Affected versions: PX4-Autopilot <= 1.11.3.
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* Fixed in version:
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* nuttx#016873788280ca815ba886195535bbe601de6e48.
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* nuttx-apps#2fc1157f8585acc39f13a31612ebf890f41e76ca.
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* px4-autopilot#555f900cf52c0057e4c429ff3699c91911a21cab.
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* References:
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* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-34125.
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* https://github.com/PX4/PX4-Autopilot/issues/17062.
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* https://github.com/PX4/PX4-Autopilot/pull/17264/commits/555f900cf52c0057e4c429ff3699c91911a21cab.
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* https://www.st.com/resource/en/application_note/dm00493651-introduction-to-stm32-microcontrollers-security-stmicroelectronics.pdf.
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* https://nuttx.apache.org/.
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* https://nuttx.apache.org/docs/latest/applications/nsh/commands.html#access-memory-mb-mh-and-mw.
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* https://gist.github.com/swkim101/f473b9a60e6d4635268402a2cd2025ac.
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* https://github.com/apache/incubator-nuttx/pull/3292/commits/016873788280ca815ba886195535bbe601de6e48.
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* https://github.com/apache/incubator-nuttx-apps/pull/647/commits/2fc1157f8585acc39f13a31612ebf890f41e76ca.
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An issue discovered in Yuneec Mantis Q and PX4-Autopilot v1.11.3 and below
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allow attacker to gain access to sensitive information via various nuttx
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commands.
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CVE-2021-26461
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--------------
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* Title: malloc, realloc and memalign implementations are vulnerable
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to integer wrap-arounds.
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* Published: 2021-06-21.
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* Affected versions: < 10.1.0.
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* Fixed in version: 10.1.0.
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* Type: `CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/190.html>`_.
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* Credits: Apache NuttX would like to thank Omri Ben-Bassat of Section 52
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at Azure Defender for IoT of Microsoft Corp for bringing this issue
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to our attention.
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* References:
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* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-26461.
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* https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r806fccf8b003ae812d807c6c7d97950d44ed29b2713418cbe3f2bddd%40%3Cdev.nuttx.apache.org%3E.
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Apache Nuttx Versions prior to 10.1.0 are vulnerable to integer wrap-around
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in functions malloc, realloc and memalign. This improper memory assignment
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can lead to arbitrary memory allocation, resulting in unexpected behavior
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such as a crash or a remote code injection/execution.
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CVE-2020-17529
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--------------
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* Title: Apache NuttX (incubating) Out of Bound Write from invalid
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fragmentation offset value specified in the IP header.
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* Published: 2020-12-09.
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* Affected versions: < 10.0.1.
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* Fixed in version: 10.0.1.
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* Type: `CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/787.html>`_.
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* Credits: Apache NuttX would like to thank Forescout for reporting the issue.
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* References:
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* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-17529.
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* http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/12/09/5.
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* https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r4d71ae3ab96b589835b94ba7ac4cb88a704e7307bceefeab749366f3%40%3Cdev.nuttx.apache.org%3E.
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Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability in TCP Stack of Apache NuttX (incubating)
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versions up to and including 9.1.0 and 10.0.0 allows attacker to corrupt
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memory by supplying and invalid fragmentation offset value specified
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in the IP header. This is only impacts builds with both CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL
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and CONFIG_NET_TCP_REASSEMBLY build flags enabled.
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CVE-2020-17528
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--------------
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* Title: Apache NuttX (incubating) Out of Bound Write from invalid TCP
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Urgent length.
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* Published: 2020-12-09.
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* Affected versions: < 10.0.1.
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* Fixed in version: 10.0.1.
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* Type: `CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/787.html>`_.
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* Credits: Apache NuttX would like to thank Forescout for reporting the issue.
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* References:
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* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-17528.
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* http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/12/09/4.
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* https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r7f4215aba288660b41b7e731b6262c8275fa476e91e527a74d2888ea%40%3Cdev.nuttx.apache.org%3E.
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|
Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability in TCP stack of Apache NuttX (incubating)
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versions up to and including 9.1.0 and 10.0.0 allows attacker to corrupt
|
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memory by supplying arbitrary urgent data pointer offsets within TCP packets
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including beyond the length of the packet.
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CVE-2020-1939
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-------------
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* Published: 2020-05-12.
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* Affected versions: >= 6.15 , <= 8.2.
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* Fixed in version: 9.0.0.
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* References:
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* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-1939.
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* https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/re3adc65ff4d8d9c34e5bccba3941a28cbb0a47191c150df2727e101d%40%3Cdev.nuttx.apache.org%3E.
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The Apache NuttX (Incubating) project provides an optional separate "apps"
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repository which contains various optional components and example programs.
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One of these, ftpd, had a NULL pointer dereference bug. The NuttX RTOS itself
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is not affected. Users of the optional apps repository are affected only
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if they have enabled ftpd. Versions 6.15 to 8.2 are affected.
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CVE-2018-20578
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|
--------------
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* Published: 2018-12-28.
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* Affected versions: < 7.27.
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* Fixed in version: 7.27.
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* References:
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* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2018-20578.
|
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* https://bitbucket.org/nuttx/nuttx/issues/119/denial-of-service-infinite-loop-while.
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* https://bitbucket.org/nuttx/nuttx/downloads/nuttx-7_27-README.txt.
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An issue was discovered in NuttX before 7.27. The function
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netlib_parsehttpurl() in apps/netutils/netlib/netlib_parsehttpurl.c
|
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mishandles URLs longer than hostlen bytes (in the webclient, this is set
|
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by default to 40), leading to an Infinite Loop.
|
|
The attack vector is the Location header of an HTTP 3xx response.
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|